Recent U.S. Supreme Court Summaries – 3/29/17

Manuel v. City of Joliet, No. 14-9496 [Arg: 10.5.2016 Trans./Aud.; Decided 3.21.2017]

Holding: (1) Elijah Manuel may challenge his pretrial detention on Fourth Amendment grounds; and (2) on remand, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit should determine the accrual date of Manuel's Fourth Amendment claim, unless it finds that the city of Joliet has previously waived its timeliness argument.

{The District Court dismissed Manuel’s suit, holding, first, that the applicable two-year statute of limitations barred his unlawful arrest claim, and, second, that under binding Circuit precedent, pretrial detention following the start of legal process (here, the judge’s probable-cause determination) could not give rise to a Fourth Amendment claim.  Manuel appealed the dismissal of his unlawful detention claim; the Seventh Circuit affirmed.}

Moore v. Texas, No. 15-797 [Arg: 11.29.2016 Trans./Aud.; Decided 3.28.2017]

Holding: By rejecting the habeas court's application of current medical diagnostic standards and by following the standard under Ex parte Briseno, including the nonclinical Briseno factors, the decision of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals does not comport with the Eighth Amendment and Supreme Court precedents.

{Petitioner Moore was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death for fatally shooting a store clerk during a botched robbery that occurred when Moore was 20 years old. The state habeas court examined recent psychiatric standards and  held that the defendant should not be sentenced to death under Atkins.  The Texas CCA held instead that the state habeas court erred by not following the CCA’s 2004 decision in Ex parte Briseno.}

Recent Illinois Supreme Court Opinions – 3-29-17

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. BRIAN PEARSE, Appellant (Opinion filed March 23, 2017)

Following a jury trial in the circuit court of Boone County, defendant, Brian Pearse, was convicted of failing to register his address in accordance with section 3 of the Sex Offender Registration Act (Act) (730 ILCS 150/3 (West 2012)). On appeal, defendant argued that (1) he was not proved guilty of that offense beyond a reasonable doubt and (2) the trial court erred in giving the jury nonpattern instructions that did not apply to the facts of the case. The appellate court, with one justice dissenting, affirmed the defendant’s conviction. 2016 IL App (2d) 140051-U. We allowed the defendant’s petition for leave to appeal (Ill. S. Ct. R. 315(a) (eff. Jan. 1, 2015)) and now reverse the judgment of the appellate court.

{“Thus, we believe it is the intent of the legislature that the offender be tracked by giving notice to the law enforcement authorities in the jurisdiction he is leaving. Defendant was not charged with failure to give that notice, and there was no evidence in any event that he failed to do so. We conclude that the evidence presented by the State failed to establish a violation of section 3 of the Act, the section specified in the indictment. Given this finding, there is no need to address the instructional issue raised in this appeal. … we reverse the judgment of the appellate court.”}

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. ARCHIE C. HOWARD, Appellant. (Opinion filed March 23, 2017)

Following a bench trial in the circuit court of Peoria County, the defendant, Archie Howard, was convicted of violating section 11-9.3(b) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (720 ILCS 5/11-9.3(b) (West 2010)). This provision generally makes it unlawful for a child sex offender to knowingly loiter within 500 feet of a school while persons under the age of 18 are present. Defendant appealed, arguing that the evidence presented at his trial was insufficient to prove him guilty of “loitering” within the meaning of the statute and that the statutory provision was unconstitutionally vague. The appellate court affirmed defendant’s conviction, with one justice dissenting. 2016 IL App (3d) 130959. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the appellate court.